Sowing Intrigue And Mistrust

Abstract

This paper advances the idea that judicial corruption can be torn apart from the inside. The insight is that since corrupt deals are not legally enforceable and parties rely exclusively on trust, public policy makers should aim to destroy that trust. This paper suggests that a way to do it could be through a reward mechanism, where the whistleblower is awarded an amount that exceeds the potential payoff of the bribe. It also allows lawyers or judges to fake a bribe to catch the one who accepts it. This last part is fundamental for corrupt parties wouldn't know if they are dealing with an "honest" briber or with someone who is just trying to get a reward. Under this uncertainty, corruption is no longer rational, and its drive is diluted. However, for this to work in practice, some empirical conditions must be met. This paper advances a methodology with which to test their existence in the Ecuadorian legal community. A few practice surveys were obtained, as a mean of example. However, the results should not be taken as conclusive but as mere references. A large-scale study needs to be conducted in order to obtain reliable results.